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RECENT CASES
hearing. If one may be deprived of his liberty in a so-called "non-
criminal" proceeding, then the rights consistent with due process must
also extend to such hearings if the spirit and intent of the due process
requirement is to be met.
Juvenile court legislation has done much to improve upon our
judicial system. Its goals, standards, and ideals are commendable.
The fact remains, however, that the practice does not yet measure up
to the theory-the reality has not yet equated the ambition. Until the
juvenile courts can more closely approach the ideals set for them, it is
believed that children brought before them should never be deprived
of their liberty without benefit of procedural due process safeguards.
It is strongly urged that the example set by the District of Columbia3 6
and Californiao 7 should be followed.38 The purpose of juvenile legisla-
tion is to enhance the position of the juvenile offender before our
courts. It is difficult, therefore, to justify a denial of procedural safe-
guards when such denial will certainly make his position less secure.
Why should an infant be denied those privileges and rights accruing
to the adult offender? To say, "Because the infant doesn't need such
protection in view of the fact that the proceeding is non-criminal",
is to allow legal fictions and semantic manipulation to overcome reason
and common sense.3 9
Charles L. Calk
CONsTrruToNAL LAW-RACIAL DiscnmnNATioN-DENiAL oF DUE PRoc-
Ess-Relators, three Chinese-born minors, claimed admission to the
United States as citizens by derivation from one Lee Ha, concededly
an American citizen and alleged to be their father. The Board of
Special Inquiry, Immigration and Naturalization Service, solely on the
basis of blood grouping tests held to preclude paternity, rejected their
claim and they were taken into custody pursuant to that determination.
Habeas Corpus was then brought against the District Director of
3 6 In addition to the instant case, see In re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224 (1955).37 In re Contreras, 241 P. 2d 631 (Cal. C.A. 1952).
38 Id. at 633. While the juvenile court law provides that adjudication of a
minor to be a ward of the court shall not be deemed to be a conviction of crime,
this is a legal fiction, presenting a challenge to credulity and doing violence to
reaso.....
3" For further evidence of what may be a trend in the right direction, see
Ex Parte State ex rel. Echols, 245 Ala. 353, 17 So. 2d 449 (1944) (which in-
dicated that having an attorney representing the infant in juvenile court was not
only entirely proper, but may have been a matter of right, where a pending prose-
cution for murder entered into the issue of delinquency); Dendy v. Wilson, 142
Tex. 460, 179 S.W. 2d 269 (1944) (which held that the privilege against self-
incrimination extends to juvenile court proceedings).
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Immigration and Naturalization Service, New York, to secure their
release from custody. The Federal District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York held that a rule of the immigration authority requir-
ing that one seeking admission to the United States on the ground that
he is the child of a citizen of the United States submit to a blood test
was a denial of due process since it applies only to persons of Chinese
descent, regardless of sufficiency of other proof of paternity. On ap-
peal to the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, Held:
Reversed, Justice Frank dissenting. The record failed to show that
there was such racial discrimination in requiring blood tests of foreign-
born persons claiming derivative citizenship as would deny due process
to Chinese-born persons claiming such citizenship. The court further
held, Justice Frank concurring, that if blood tests are conducted with-
out discrimination on racial grounds, there is no denial of due process
in requiring blood tests to determine paternity of foreign-born persons
claiming derivative citizenship, even though there are no statutes or
official, authorized regulations permitting the Immigration Service to
make use of blood tests as a method of non-discriminatory investigative
procedure. United States v. Shaughnessy, 237 F. 2d 307 (2d Cir. 1956).
Relators claimed that no blood tests were required of white persons
but that all Chinese-born persons seeking admission to the United
States as citizens by derivation were required to submit to such tests.
After being told that they had to submit to the tests or be excluded,
two blood grouping tests were made of the entire family. These tests
established conclusively that Lee Ha could not be the father of two
of the relators. On this basis alone, relators were excluded. Other
evidence was sufficient to the extent that if no blood grouping tests
had been conducted relators would have been admitted to the United
States. Was the holding that such evidence was conclusive on the
issue of paternity correct? In order to correctly answer this question,
it is desirable to examine the background and history of the blood
grouping tests to determine the extent of their reliability and the
weight courts should give them-assuming they are properly conducted
and that the person who conducted them is available for examination.
Blood grouping tests were predicated on the discovery that the red
corpuscles in human blood contain two affirmative agglutinating sub-
stances called agglutinogens. 1 There are four types of blood: one con-
taining both substances, AB; one containing A; another B; and the
fourth containing neither, 0. Scientists determined that every in-
dividual's blood falls into one of these classes and remains the same
177 Journal American Medical Association 682, 1999 (1921); 78 J.A.M.A.
873 (1922). See 84 J.A.M.A. 636 (1925).
REcENT CASES
throughout life.2 This blood individuality is an hereditary character-
istic handed down from parent to offspring according to the Mendelian
Law of inheritance.3 According to scientific findings, no agglutinating
substance can appear in a child which was not present in one of its
parents. 4 The blood tests cannot prove that a certain man is the father
of a child, but they can prove that he is not the father of the child 5 in
certain combinations.
Foreign courts were the first to accept these tests as evidence of
non-paternity. 6 The value of these tests and their reliability were sub-
sequently recognized by the courts of the United States,7 and some
states have enacted legislation directing that in cases raising the issue
of paternity the persons involved submit to the tests and such tests be
admitted as evidence of non-paternity.8 However, even among states
where the evidence is admissible, there is a conflict as to the weight
to which the tests should be entitled. Some say it is conclusive on the
issue of paternity where it establishes non-paternity and where the
accuracy of the testing methods is established. Others hold that it is
to be considered together with other pertinent evidence.9 California
is perhaps the leading authority which holds that it is not conclusive
while New York leads in holding that it is conclusive.10 The California
Supreme Court in Arais v. Kalensnikoff" refused to accept the negative
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid. and see 12 A.B.A.J. 441 (1926).
4 Supra note 1.
5 Ibid.
6104 A.L.R. 430 at 449 (1936).
7 Ibid.
8 The Civil Practice Act of N.Y., see. 306a (1948) states that:
Wherever it shall be relevant to the prosecution or defense of an
action.., the court, by order, shall direct any party to the action...
and the child of any such party and the person involved in the con-
troversy to submit to one or more blood-grouping tests. . . . When-
ever such test is ordered and made, the results thereof shall be re-
ceivable in evidence only where definite exclusion is established.
In cases involving blood grouping tests, constitutional questions have arisen re-
garding the issue whether the admissibility violated the privilege against self-
incrimination. The courts in most states hold such contentions untenable. 46
A.L.R. 2d 1014 (1956). This view is applied in both criminal and civil cases.
The Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity provides for the issuance
of blood grouping test orders in civil and criminal proceedings in which paternity
is a relevant fact. This act has been adopted in California, Michigan, New Hamp-
shire, and Oregon. There is no statutory authorization for such blood test in Ken-
tucky. The Kentucky Court has held that taking a blood specimen from a de-
fendant in a criminal case violates the constitutional provision that no defendant
in a criminal case shall be a witness against himself. McManus v. Commonwealth,
264 Ky. 240, 94 S.W. 2d 609 (1936). Also see 164 A.L.R. 969 (1946) and 104
A.L.R. 449 (1936).
9 46 A.L.R.2d 1005, 1028 (1956).
10 Id. at 1028, 1033.
11 Arais v. Kalensnikoff, 10 Cal. 428, 74 P. 2d 1043 (1937).
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results of the tests as conclusive evidence of non-paternity where
there was a conflict between the scientific testimony and testimony as
to collateral facts. Rather, the court stated that it was for the jury to
determine the relative weight of the evidence. In that case, the results
of blood tests showed conclusively that the father could not be the
parent of the child. However, there was testimony to the effect that
the alleged father had been seen at the mother's home on many oc-
casions, that he paid the nurse who attended the mother, that he had
bought groceries and clothing for the child, and had told various per-
sons that the child was his. Due to this conflict between the scientific
testimony and the collateral fact testimony, the court refused to ac-
cept the tests as conclusive evidence of non-paternity. The court
adopted this view in the Chaplin case'2 and courts in other states have
adopted a similar position.' s
The better view is that adopted by New York holding the tests to
be reliable and infallible. In Anonymous v. Anonymous,14 the husband
was allowed to disprove the paternity of a child even though he had
lived with the mother during the entire period of gestation and for
five years thereafter. The court accepted the tests as definitely exclud-
ing the defendant as a possible father of the child. Members of the
medical profession believe that the tests should be conclusive evidence
of non-paternity and have encouraged the legal profession to adopt
measures directing persons to submit to the tests in all litigation in-
volving the issue of paternity.15 That the medical profession considers
the tests conclusive evidence of non-paternity is indicated in the ap-
proval of the results in the Anonymous case.' The profession re-
established its faith and reliability in the tests when approval was
given to the results in the Anonymous case and to the court's declara-
tion that: "The tests, of course, will be relevant only if they show non-
compatibility as between the blood of defendant, the plaintiff, and th6
twins. If so, such evidence should be deemed conclusive as to non-
paternity." 7 As the American Medical Association remarks: "Science
has thus prevented the continuation of an injustice to a husband by the
activities of an unfaithful wife."' 8
The federal court has held that blood grouping tests are competent
evidence to establish non-paternity in nationality cases and are not
12 Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. Rep. 652, 169 P. 2d 442 (1946).
13 State v. Damm, 62 S.D. 123, 252 N.W. 7 (1933). Annot. 46 A.L.R. 2d
1000 (1956).
14 150 N.Y.S. 2d 344 (1956).
15 Supra note 1.
16 "Medicine and the Law", 161 J.A.M.A. 1486 (Aug. 11, 1956).
17 Ibid.18 Id. at 1487.
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limited to the male in a matrimonial or bastardy case.' 9 And giving
conclusive weight to such tests by a board of special inquiry does not
constitute a denial of due process.20 Accordingly, the court was cor-
rect in ruling that the tests in the instant case conclusively established
that relators were not the offspring of Lee Ha, and that such wasf not a
denial of due process.
However, where facts establish a deliberate use of the blood test
technique to exclude Chinese-born persons and admit others similarly
qualified, except for race, the discrimination is clearly unconstitu-
tional.21 The Constitution of the United States is violated if arbitrary
and unjust discrimination founded on differences of race between
persons otherwise in similar circumstances are made.22 Racial dis-
crimination is abhorrent to our institutions.23 The issue directly before
the court in the principal case was whether relators had been racially
discriminated against by requiring them to submit to blood grouping
tests while excluding others. Was the court correct in holding that
the finding below, that the testing of these relators was actuated by
racial discrimination, was not warranted?
Examination of the cases involving Chinese-born persons seeking
admission to the United States as citizens demonstrated that the court
was correct in holding that no arbitrary racial discrimination had been
practiced on relators.24 Blood grouping tests in the case of such persons
are necessary by reason of the pattern and type of case, not because
the persons involved happen to be of the Chinese race. Inadequate
records of marriages and birth and the many Chinese who illegally
attempt to enter this country make necessary the use of blood tests
to determine paternity. A typical pattern is followed in these cases. 25
(1) The alleged father claims to have returned to China for the pur-
pose of marriage or a visit. Within a year or so a child is born; then,
following a second or third conception, the father returns to the United
States. Later application is filed for admittance of the child or children.
A similarity of facts follows. Offspring always followed cohabitation
with the wife in China, the children are preponderantly male in
startling proportions, and despite the fact that the children are born
in rural villages without any known means of modern conveniences,
19 Lue Chow Kon v. Brownell, 220 F. 2d 187 (3d Civ. 1955).
20 U.S. v. Shaughnessy, 220 F. 2d 537 (2d Civ. 1955).
21 Hoy v. Shaughnessy, 123 F. Supp. 674 (D.C. N.Y. 1954).
-L Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497 (1954).2 3 Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954); Supra note 22.
24 See Mar Gong v. McGranery, 109 F. Supp. 821 (D.C. Cal. 1952).
25 Ibid.
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all children born survive and none are deformed or ailing. (2) The
practice developed of preparing coaching books or "Halgoons" com-
prising an extensive background of family conditions which the alleged
family members memorize in an effort to avoid inconsistences and to
cover up fraud. (3) The witnesses are always interested in the pro-
ceeding, and it is extremely difficult for the Service to disprove
paternity on fact testimony alone. The federal court in the case of
Gong v. Brownell 6 held that in proceedings where a Chinese-born
person attempts to establish his United States citizenship, testimony on
behalf of the Chinese given by interested witnesses is not required to
be believed, notwithstanding the fact that such testimony is uncon-
tradicted. Because of these factors and the suspicion of substitution
of children solely for the purpose of entry into the United States, the
use of the blood test was seized upon as a genuinely tangible method
of reaching the truth. It was not used extensively until after the
interior of China was closed, making it impossible to determine pa-
ternity on the basis of fact alone. And the court found that the in-
structions directing the use of blood tests in Chinese visa petition
cases at no time precluded the use of blood tests in non-Chinese cases
nor directed the use of blood tests exclusively in Chinese cases. There
was thus no arbitrary racial discrimination. Rather it was a proper
administrative motive for the aid of investigators in solving difficult
cases.
Two recent cases handed down by the Federal Court of Appeals
have recognized the problem involved here.27 The question of racial
discrimination was not as compelling in those cases as here and do
not, therefore, control this case. However, the court recognized the
problem and stated in Kon v. Browne1l28 that in view of obstacles to
investigation by ordinary means into family history and evidence of
parentage of Chinese persons, the giving of blood tests to test paternity
claims only to Chinese applicants for declaration of nationality would
not effect unconstitutional discrimination based on race or color.
Relators offered no evidence in that case that the tests were given
only to Chinese, but the court stated that even if that fact were estab-
lished, it would not in itself show the discrimination was based on
race or color. And in United States v. Shaughnesy 29 the court held
that the requirement that foreign-born Chinese seeking admission to
the United States as sons of American citizens submit to a blood test
26Mar Gong v. Brownell, 209 F. 2d 448 (9th Civ. 1954); see Flynn v. Ward,
104 F. 2d 900, 902 (1st Civ. 1939).
27 Supra note 19, 20.
28 Ibid.
29Ibid.
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is justified by lack of reliable written governmental records of birth
and parentage.
An analogous situation is presented in Hirabayashi v. United
States.30 Pursuant to an Executive Order by the President while the
United States was at war with Japan, the military commander of the
Western Defense Command promulgated an order requiring, inter alia,
that all persons of Japanese ancestry within a designated military area
be within their place of residence between the hours of 8 p.m. and
6 a.m. A United States citizen of Japanese ancestry was convicted for
violation of the curfew order. The court held that the order did not
unconstitutionally discriminate against citizens of Japanese ancestry,
but that it was a war measure designed to protect against sabotage
and espionage. Likewise, the requirements of a blood test in the case
of Chinese-born persons is a protective device. It protects the public
from an influx of illegal immigrants. Assuming the tests are infallible,
the honest Chinese have nothing to fear from such a requirement. It
is the Chinese with a guilty disposition who fear such tests. To refuse
the Immigration Service permission to require such tests would impede
its operation and again open the gate to a flood of illegal immigrants.
A decision of the Service holding an applicant not of a status entitling
him to admission should not be rejected in habeas corpus unless result-
ing from manifest abuse of power and discretion.31 It is clear that the
evidence in this case was sufficient to exclude relators and that there
was no abuse of power. Accordingly, the court was correct in exclud-
ing relators and holding that there was no denial of due process. 32
Beauchamp E. Brogan
30 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). See Takahashi v. Com-
mission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) where the Court held that a California statute bar-
ring issuance of commercial fishing licenses to persons ineligible to citizenship,
which classification included resident alien Japanese and precluded such a one
from earning his living as a commercial fisherman in the ocean waters off the coast
of the State was unconstitutional.
And see the vigorous dissents in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
S1944) where the majority of the Court held that an order directing the exclusion
from a West Coast military area of all persons of Japanese ancestry was constitu-
tional as of the time it was made.
31 Dharandas Tulsidas et al v. Insular Collector of Customs, 262 U.S. 258
(1923).3 2 Since the principal case was first decided in 1952, the Immigration Service
has applied the tests to all immigrants applying for entry to the United States on a
claim of paternity, so that the problem has been eliminated. However, it is be-
lieved that this change was not necessary in view of the conclusion that there was
no arbitrary discrimination in requiring blood tests in cases involving Chinese-
born persons. Note dissent by Justice Frank in principal case at page 315.
